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The emergence of new direct-acting antiviral drugs (DAAs) has revolutionized the treatment 
of hepatitis C virus (HCV); these more effective and better tolerated drugs allow for cure rates 
exceeding 90%. The price of these new therapies, however, is prohibitive in many countries, so 
creative strategies are needed for assuring access. Brazil, a pioneer in the fight against HIV–AIDS, is 
now at the forefront in addressing HCV. The country’s strategy, which combines evidence-based 
treatment protocols and innovative initiatives for local production of generic DAAs, needs to be 
considered in light of ongoing conflicts over pharmaceutical patents.  
An estimated 700,000 people in Brazil are living with hepatitis C. In 2017, in keeping with the 
World Health Organization (WHO) goal of eliminating HCV by 2030, the Brazilian Ministry of Health 
(MoH) ensured that 50,000 patients were treated. The decision to follow the most current 
treatment protocol available was made possible by innovative approaches to cost containment. In 
2015, Brazil’s National Committee for Health Technology Assessment had assessed the feasibility of 
incorporating sofosbuvir, a core drug of modern HCV treatment protocols, and considered which 
patients should receive it. Whereas the country’s approach to HIV–AIDS involved offering treatment 
to everyone in need, the MoH adopted an incremental strategy for HCV.1 The program started with 
patients with severe liver fibrosis and coinfections and expanded over time to encompass the whole 
patient population. Brazil has also launched a range of initiatives focused on diagnosis and 
prevention, as recommended by the WHO. 
Extending treatment to everyone with HCV has serious financial implications, given the cost 
of DAAs. Since Brazil was excluded from Gilead’s sofosbuvir licensing scheme, which makes 
discounted versions of the drug available in 91 countries, authorized generics were not available. In 
Brazil, the imperative to obtain lower prices is augmented by patients’ tendency to secure access to 
treatments through litigation. When preparing to purchase substantial quantities of HCV medicines 
to expand treatment, the MoH demanded that commercial prices be lower than international 
market prices.1 In 2015, by leveraging the government’s considerable purchasing power in this way, 
Brazil was able to secure a 90% price discount from the U.S. list price for sofosbuvir–daclatasvir.  
In parallel to its negotiations with international pharmaceutical firms, Brazil has made 
substantial efforts to enable local production of generic versions of sofosbuvir and, more recently, 
daclatasvir. Since 2007, the MoH has promoted the creation of consortia involving private 
pharmaceutical companies and public laboratories, called productive development partnerships 
(PDPs), for the development of drugs considered strategically important.2 Sofosbuvir and daclatasvir 
have been so designated, and multiple PDPs are working toward producing generic versions of both 
(one of the sofosbuvir PDPs includes Gilead, the originator company). One consortium, involving the 
local drug companies Microbiologica and Blanver and the federal laboratory Farmanguinhos, 
progressed to the point of registering a generic version of sofosbuvir with Brazil’s health regulatory 
agency, ANVISA (Agência Nacional de Vigilância Sanitária), signaling a willingness to provide 
sofosbuvir at USD 8.50 per pill, one quarter of Gilead’s price.3  
In a country with severe budget constraints, reducing expenditures on HCV medicines in this 
way would be an important achievement that could enable the expansion of treatment programs. 
However, the MoH’s ability to take advantage of this supply source is complicated by the intellectual 
property situation in Brazil.  
Patent protection for sofosbuvir has been controversial in many countries, including Brazil. 
International and Brazilian nongovernmental organizations urged the government to deny patent 
protection and submitted opposition documents to the patent office (Instituto Nacional de 
Propriedade Industrial, or INPI) arguing, as they have elsewhere, that the science involved in the 
drug’s development was neither new nor inventive and that the medication, despite all its clinical 
benefits, therefore does not deserve patent protection.4 Pharmaceutical patents can be granted in 
Brazil only if they’re approved by both the INPI and ANVISA. In the case of the key sofosbuvir patent 
application, ANVISA, heeding the criticism that Gilead’s product lacked novelty and inventiveness, 
and in light of the drug’s strategic importance, denied its consent.  
After ANVISA's decision was overturned in court, INPI subsequently approved the patent (a 
decision that was also temporarily suspended by a regional court), though one that is substantially 
narrower than what Gilead had applied for. While the ultimate legal status of this patent in Brazil 
remains unsettled, with the local consortium claiming that its version is non-infringing, the MoH has 
proceeded to purchase the less expensive product. Meanwhile, Gilead continues to press for 
additional patents in Brazil on HCV drugs.   
The barriers to eliminating HCV in Brazil would be heightened by patent protection, but they 
would not be insurmountable. The capabilities developed by the PDPs can still contribute to the 
Brazilian government’s broader strategy for reducing prices by relying on local production. Being 
able to produce medicines locally, at lower cost was crucial to reducing the prices of drugs for AIDS, 
diabetes, and other conditions, saving the MoH billions of dollars over the years; conversely, the 
inability to produce some drugs locally made price negotiations less fruitful. Even if Gilead were to 
obtain broad patent protection for sofosbuvir and remain the sole supplier, the existence of the local 
consortia and their potential to serve as alternative sources of the drug can aid the government as it 
engages in price negotiations. One tactic that countries may take in negotiating prices is to threaten 
to suspend the exclusivity rights that patents provide by issuing a “compulsory license,” thereby 
enabling alternative sources of supply. For this to be a credible threat, patent law must allow the 
country to issue a compulsory license under the relevant conditions, with royalty payments to the 
originator company, and alternative suppliers must be available. In Brazil, thanks to changes made to 
the patent law in the early 2000s and to the existence of the PDPs, these conditions are satisfied. So 
long as the MoH is committed to HCV treatment, it has instruments available to achieve this goal. 
Brazil’s strategy for eliminating HCV, like its response to HIV–AIDS, shows that it is possible 
for resource-limited countries to make modern, high-cost health care treatments available to all. 
Brazil continues to provide important lessons on using industrial policy to achieve health objectives, 
even in the presence of pharmaceutical patents.  
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